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Abstract 
 
Background: Medical education is critical and the first step to foster the competence 
of a physician. Unlike developed countries, China has been adopting a system of 
multi-tiered medical education to training physicians, which is featured by the 
provision of an alternative lower level of medical practitioners, or known as a 
feldsher system since 1950s. This study aimed to illustrate the impact of multi-tiered 
medical education on both the equity in the delivery of health care services and the 
efficiency of the health care market. 
Methods: Based on both theoretical reasoning and empirical analysis, this paper 
documented evidences upon those impacts of the medical education system.  
Results: First, the geographic distribution of physicians in China is not uniform across 
physicians with different education training. Second, we also find the evidence that 
high-educated doctors are more likely to be hired by larger hospitals, which in turn 
add the fuel to foster the hospital-center health care system in China as patients 
choose large hospitals to chase good doctors. Third, through the channels of adverse 
selection and moral hazard, the heterogeneity in medical education also imposes 
costs to the health care market in China. 
Discussion: Overall, the three-tiered medical education system in China is a standard 
policy trade-off between quantity and quality in training health care professionals. 
On one hand, China gains the benefit of increasing supply of health care 
professionals at lower costs. On the other hand, China pays the price for keeping a 
multi-tiered medical education in terms of increasing inequality and efficiency loss in 
the health care sector. Finally, we discuss the potential policy options for China to 
mitigate the negative impact of keeping a multi-tiered medical education on the 
performance of health care market. 
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Introduction 
Physicians are the captains of the health care team, indicating that whether 
physicians are competent has an important implication on the quality of health care 
services. Medical education is the first step to foster the competence of a physician, 
although learning by doing (on-the-job training) and other channels such as 
continuing education are also important to assure that physicians remain competent. 
In most high-income countries, physicians are a homogeneous group in that they 
receive the same level of education training no matter where they practice. In China, 
however, physicians are heterogeneous in that physicians differ in their education 
training. Some receive full training in their medical professional education program 
while others only receive a short or partial training, hereafter we refer to this as the 
multi-tiered medical education system. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the potential impacts of the multi-tiered 
medical education system from the perspective of health economics. Specifically, we 
investigate the effects of the multi-tiered medical education system on the 
performance of health care market in terms of equity and efficiency. We address two 
research questions: first, to what extent that the heterogeneity of medical education 
influences the equity in the delivery of health care services in China; second, what 
kind of costs, in terms of both equity and efficiency, that China needs to pay for 
maintaining such a multi-tiered medical education system.  
This study contains the following sections. In the next section, we first provide an 
institutional background on China’s medical education system. The key institutional 
feature is that China has adopted a multi-tiered education system to train physicians 
since 1950s. The Methods part demonstrated analysis strategy and empirical 
methods. The Results section revealed long-term impacts of medical system on the 
performance of health care market. The Discussion section documented the pros and 
cons of the medical education system, provided explanations from economic 
perspectives and discussed mitigation policies. The final part presents a summary of 
the major findings and contributions. 
4 
 
Institutional Background 
Overview 
In China, there are substantial differences in the quality of medical education 
due to the existence of a three-tier education program. The first tier is 
degree-oriented medical education, or bachelor program, which include 5 years of 
undergraduate medical studies followed by 3 years of residence. The second tier is 
still a tertiary medical education, or called junior medical colleges, which provide 3 
years of study after high school and lead to a vocational diploma. The third tier is a 
secondary level medical education, or named secondary vocational schools, which 
provide very limited medical training after junior middle school and lead to a 
secondary vocational diploma (SVD) [1-4]. Some doctors may receive master or 
doctoral degree by extending the year of their training after the undergraduate study. 
For simplicity, we combine these two groups of doctors into the group of bachelor 
degree and refer them as a group of “bachelor degree or above.” 
The current law allows medical graduates with non-bachelor degree to become 
assistant doctors and then they have the chance to obtain the full doctor licensure 
after they accumulate certain years of work experience and pass an examination [3, 
4]. Thus, at a given point in time, the pool of Chinese physicians containing three 
types of physicians with different level of education training, hereafter, we refer 
these variations in education training across doctors as heterogeneity of medical 
education. 
We further differentiate two types of heterogeneity in physicians in China from 
perspective of health economics, because, in the milestone paper of health 
economics, Arrow reported that four variables are deemed most important in the 
market of physicians: price of physicians (or wage rate of physicians); quantity of 
physicians; quality of entering medical students, and quality of medical education [5]. 
It is that, at least two critical variables, both the quality of entering students and 
quality of medical programs substantially varied. First, medical students admitted 
into the bachelor program and junior medical college program are significantly 
different in terms of their quality. Like many other countries, graduates from high 
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school who attempt to receive tertiary level education need to take the national 
college entrance examination (NCEE), however those scores for bachelor programs in 
medicine are much higher than that for junior medical colleges. For example, only 
students who basically rank top forty-percent in NCEE have admissions into medical 
bachelor programs for the whole country, so junior medical colleges have to recruit 
from students ranked below forty-percent in NCEE [6]. Second, students who attend 
secondary vocational schools out of junior middle school have only a minimum 9 
years of basic education, which brings about the quality problem of the entering 
students on the one hand; those secondary vocational schools in medicine generally 
offer limited and tailored courses to meet demands of those students on the other 
hand.  
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of physicians by education level between 
2002 and 2014. Although the share of physicians with bachelor degree or above has 
increased over time, from 28% in 2002 to 48% in 2014, there are still more than half 
of physicians in China who do not receive the full entry-level medical training 
according to the current international standard. Entry-level medical education 
programs are tertiary-level courses undertaken at a medical school. Depending on 
jurisdiction and university, these may be either undergraduate-entry (most of Europe, 
Asia, South America and Oceania), or graduate-entry programs (mainly Australia, 
North America), therefore gaining a basic medical degree may take from five to eight 
or even nine years (Please refer to: 
http://www.who.int/topics/education_medical/en/).  
To be specific, in 2014, 48% of physicians in China possess a bachelor degree or 
above; 31% of physicians received medical training through junior medical colleges; 
and about one in every five physicians only received medical education through a 
much abbreviated training program (SVD). The substantial variations in the years of 
medical education program across physicians in China suggest that the Chinese 
doctors is not a homogenous group. Rather, they are substantially heterogeneous in 
that one doctor is not the same as the other doctor in terms of quality of enrolled 
students and educational training.  
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Historical perspective on physicians’ supply  
Given the fact that more than half of current practicing physicians in China do 
not receive sufficient education training, an important question to be asked is 
whether this is a short-run or long-run phenomenon. If this is a short-run 
phenomenon, the heterogeneity of medical education is not a big concern as current 
situation will be phased out very soon. By contrast, the heterogeneity of medical 
education in China is a serious public concern if this is a long-run phenomenon in 
that the physicians who do not receive the sufficient education training will 
persistently prevail in the market in a significant share. In order to address this 
question, we need to first look at the evolution of medical education in China (Table 
1), and then to have more information on the annual number of enrolled medical 
students, medical graduates and new licensed physicians.  
After the communist revolution, China followed the Soviet model of medical 
education, which highlighted both independent medical schools and a feldsher 
practitioners system. Feldsher is derived from the German Feldscher, which was 
coined in the 15th century. In the 18th century, the term was then exported with 
Prussian officers to Russia. There is clear evidence on relationship between 
physicians and feldsher, however no evidence shows that feldshers will gradually 
disappear while physicians with “formal” medical training are increasing in numbers 
[7]. In vast majority of former Soviet countries, feldsher provides primary, obstetric 
and surgical care services in rural and remote areas, which featured by a 
secondary-level medical education with rather shorter period of training than the 
standard MD program.  
The upper panel of Figure 2 shows the overtime pattern in the number of 
medical graduates from secondary and tertiary medical schools during 1950 and 
1980. Before 1980, the supply of medical students from tertiary school 
(university/college) had been only half of those students from secondary school for 
the most of period, with an exception between year 1963 and 1965. Before the 
market-oriented reform, China implemented a central planning economy, in which 
medical students obtaining health care job by rationing entry. Therefore, the huge 
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supply of middle-level medical students forms the majority of doctors before 1980. 
Even up to 2002, those doctors who only had secondary-level training in medical 
education still account for 41 percent of all doctors in China (see Figure 1).  
In the lower panel of Figure 2, we depicts time trend of the number of enrolled 
medical students by education level from 1985 to 2014. It seems that the China’s 
government realized that the previous model of medical education system cannot be 
sustainable, the government attempted to shut off the secondary education for 
medical professionals since 2011. From 2011 and go on, the number of enrolled 
medical students by tertiary institutions began to surpass those from secondary 
education. Along with the transition from a rationing entry system to a market with 
licensed practicing, it is becoming extremely difficult for medical students with only 
secondary-level training to be doctors. Even though, some secondary medical 
programs (secondary diploma, e.g. in rural medicine, TCM, and medicine of ethnic 
minorities) still exist and can be allowed to get practice license after examination. A 
particular policy need to be pointed out is that a five-year medical program after 
junior middle school was started and boosted from 2004 across western China, but 
be abolished in 2014 [8, 9]. 
Health care and medical education reform 
During last two decades, the government in China proposed two waves of major 
health-care reform and followed corresponding medical education reform (Table 1). 
The first wave of reform started in 1998, which aimed to merge those independent 
medical institutions and colleges into comprehensive universities and thus expanded 
medical graduates rapidly to address profession shortage [10]. Due to the national 
health reform initialized in 2009, the ministry of education and ministry of health 
launched a comprehensive reform on medical education to improve both the 
distribution and enhance the quality of health workforce in 2012 [11]. Different from 
the 1998 reform, the principal objective of 2012 reform is to improve the quality of 
doctors instead of increasing the quantity of human resources for health. The 
assignments of the second reform since 2012 including: implementing physician 
education and training program of excellence, the establishment of accreditation 
8 
 
system of medical program among universities and the merge of professional master 
degree (master of medicine, MM) program and standardized residency training (SRT). 
The excellence plan is to build a common schedule for clinical doctors, called 5+3, in 
which 5-year of undergraduate medical education combined with 3-year of SRT will 
become a minimum requirement for a future practicing physician in China. The major 
progress of the latest reform is that the government aimed at eliminating 3-year 
medical programs at the secondary education level, which has been illustrated by the 
lower panel of Figure 2. However, the disadvantage of the reform is that the 
government still discriminately supplies heterogeneous medical professions, e.g. 
medical graduates from 3-year tertiary vocational diploma, which are deemed as the 
mainstream source of rural health workforce.  
The major progress of the current reform is to eliminate the medical programs 
in secondary-level education, so the major impact of the current reform is the 
shrinkage of stock of physicians with only secondary-vocational medical training. This 
effect was reflected by the change of educational distribution of new licensed 
physicians during the past decade [12]. In specific, according to the data obtained 
from The National Center for Medical Examination in China, we investigate the 
changing pattern of the distribution of new licensed physicians by education level 
between 2005 and 2015 (Figure 3). For all data obtained from The National Center 
for Medical Examination, we excluded physicians whose education background 
cannot be identified, which only account for a very small part of the annual total 
number (<0.1%). During this decade, the share of new physicians with middle 
education level (3-year College) remained almost constant in the range of 35 to 36%. 
However, the share of new physicians with only high-school degree decreased 
substantially, from 33% in 2005 to 17% in 2015. By contrast, the share of new 
licensed physicians with bachelor degree or above increased from 32% in 2005 to 47% 
in 2015.  
 
Methods 
Although China has initiated several rounds of reform in its medical education 
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system, we need to explore whether doctors with different education training will 
still coexist for a long time if the heterogeneity of medical education system in China 
have almost remained unchanged. We then analyze the effect of heterogeneity in 
medical education on the equity of health care. We further explore the impact of 
heterogeneity in medical education on the efficiency of health care market. 
Projection on growth of the medical practitioners 
Based on the statistical description and the same data reported in both Figures 
2 and 3, we further predict the supply trend of new licensed physicians during 
2015-2035. We made four key assumption in calculating the annual number of new 
supplied physicians in the following two decades. First, a total attrition rate in the 
medical practitioners is 3% a year for each year of the next twenty years. Second, we 
assume a consistent age structure among three educational groups. Third,  it is 
reasonable to assume that total annual supplied number remain the same, because 
the government also aim to improve the quality of medical education and control for 
the quantity in the meantime according to the current policy [9, 13]. Fourth, the 
number of new licensed doctors equal to the number of new hiring.  
We manipulated our analysis by two scenariosIn scenario 1, we assume that 
supply structure stays the same as in 2015. In scenario 2, we assume that the reform 
package keeps the current path to eliminate 3-year SVD program, specifically, the 
ratio of new physicians in SVD level decrease by one percentage for every year, while 
the ratio of new physicians in Bachelor or above level increase by one percentage for 
each year.  
The impact on equity  
In our analysis, we define equity in terms of equal access to “good” doctors, 
which in turn is measured by whether they received good education training. The 
question we would like to explore is whether individuals live in different areas have 
equal access to good doctors. We first use the aggregate statistic in national level to 
show the distribution of physicians by regions and by education levels. We then use 
the individual data to show the effect of education level on the physician’s practicing 
location between urban and rural sector. Our data was collected from a provincial 
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survey of human resources for healthcare conducted between August and October 
2009 that is a part of an overall investigation of the health system for the purpose of 
health sector reform in Fujian province (Please refer to the cited paper for 
socio-demographic characteristics of the individual data). All human resources 
working for health organizations in Fujian province until 31 December 2008 were 
included as participants; therefore this is almost a population-based dataset rather a 
sample selection [14].  
In specific, we estimated a logistic regression model in the first column, and 
then we estimated a fixed effects model in the second column. In the models, the 
dependent variable refers to a binary variable indicating the urban (=1) and rural (=0) 
settings for the hospitals, while independent variable “Higher education” indicates 
three levels of education that is consistent through our study: secondary vocational 
diploma or below (=1), college diploma (=2), bachelor or above (=3). Rather than 
attempt to control for a multitude of county level factors, we utilize county level fixed 
effects. This absorbs factors that are time-invariant but that are likely to affect 
practice location, for example, physicians in counties with higher GDP are more likely 
to practice in rural area, or have high-level of education.  
The impact on efficiency  
First, we define the concept of efficiency. We analyzed the whole market 
included both demand side (patients) and supply side (physicians) by incorporating 
their interactions and dynamics. We refer the efficiency as the allocative efficiency 
which implies the optimal mix of outputs that achieves the goal of maximizing social 
welfare or health gain, which in turn is described by the right (optimal) point on 
production possibility frontier. In other words, allocative inefficiency is reduced if we 
alter the mix of services that the health system produces so that more health gains 
or higher social welfare can be achieved from a give resource endowment. For more 
information on economic efficiency, two cited papers can provide more perspectives 
[15, 28].  
In this part, we will also utilize both theoretical reasoning and empirical analysis, 
to document evidences on the potential impact of heterogeneity in medical 
11 
 
education on the efficiency of health care sector from three perspectives: (1) 
patients; (2) physicians; and (3) the system. In the empirical study, we still use the 
dataset of human resources for healthcare collected from Fujian province in 2009 to 
analyze the relationship between education level and the distribution of physician 
practice location among hospitals with various sizes. The hospital size in China has 
four clearly ranked categories, so we used an ordered probit analysis.  
Results 
Projection on growth of the medical practitioners 
Figure 4 reports the result of our prediction on the distribution of practicing 
physicians by education level between 2015 and 2035. The result shows that the 
share of physicians with bachelor degree or above will increase over time, from 47% 
in 2015 to 54% in 2035. Although the proportion of physicians with only SVD training 
decreases over time, from 21% in 2015 to 11% in 2035, the physicians with 
vocational diploma still account for about one third of total number of practicing 
physicians in China. Putting together, even in 2035, physicians without bachelor 
degree still account for 46% of total number of practicing physicians, which indicates 
that the heterogeneity in China’s medical education is a long-run phenomenon and 
will not phase out over time. Thus, it is important to further investigate the impact of 
the heterogeneity in medical education on the equity and efficiency of health care 
market in China.  
The impact on equity  
Given the evidence that there are three types of physicians (in terms of 
education training) in China, it is important to investigate whether the distribution of 
physicians across regions in China is correlated to the variations in physician’s 
education. There is an important implication for the equity in the delivery of health 
care service if physicians with better education training are more likely to 
concentrate in certain areas, such as urban areas or high-income cities.   
As shown in Table 2, in 2005, near half of physicians who work in urban 
hospitals have bachelor degree or above. This ratio increased to near two thirds in 
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2014. By contrast, in 2005, only about 4% of physicians who practices in rural 
township hospitals own bachelor degree or above. This ratio increased to 11.9% in 
2014. Putting together, this result suggests that physicians in urban sector are more 
likely to receive a high-quality training in their medical education while physicians in 
rural sector are more likely to receive a low-quality medical training.  
The results from Table 3 show that all coefficients for age and gender are 
statistically insignificant at 1% level in the model (2). Compared to vocational 
diploma, respondents who had bachelor degree were found to be nineteen (OR = 
19.591, 95% CI = 17.809-21.552) times more likely to be associated with practicing in 
urban area. While compared to vocational diploma, respondents who had college 
diploma were found to be nearly three (OR = 2.699, 95% CI = 2.516-2.895) times 
more likely to be associated with practicing in urban area. Using the survey data 
obtained from Fujian province, the multivariate analysis indicates that physicians 
who have educational achievement higher than a bachelor degree are more likely to 
choose urban areas as the location of their practices, after controlling for all other 
variables. 
Taken together, our results indicate that the heterogeneity in physician 
education training deteriorates the degree of geographical maldistribution of 
physicians across regions in China. As observed in other countries, rural areas tend to 
have lower physician density (number of physicians per 1,000 population) than urban 
areas. Figure 5 provides supporting evidence that the time trend of physician density 
in both urban and rural areas in China has been increasing from 2005 to 2015, while 
the number for rural area has never been greater than 2, compared to that for urban 
area ranging from 2.5 to 3.8. However, in China the situation is getting worse in that 
there is a double-disparity between rural and urban areas in the geographic 
maldistribution of physicians. Rural areas not only possess a disadvantage in terms of 
quantity (i.e., low physician density), but also have a disadvantage in terms of quality. 
That is, most well-educated physicians (with bachelor degree or above) are 
concentrated in urban areas. Only a few well-educated physicians choose their 
practices in rural areas. As a result, the heterogeneity in medical education adds the 
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fuels into fire to amplify the China’s regional inequality in health care. That is, rural 
and urban residents do not have an equal access to well-educated physicians.  
The impact on efficiency 
In Table 4, the regressions use the hospital accreditation level as a proxy of 
hospital size, as in China hospital accreditation level is precisely based on the hospital 
size. Dependent variable refers to an indicator variable for small level (=1), fair level 
(=2), big level (=3) and large level (=4) hospitals. For all of the health institutions in 
China, they are categorized into four levels based on the organization size or the 
number of beds: Township-level (number of beds: 1-20); County-level (number of 
beds: 20-99); City-level (number of beds: 100-499); Provincial-level (number of 
beds: >500) [16]. The independent variable we are concerned is still the “Higher 
education”. The model (2) in the second column is still a model with county level 
fixed effects.  
As shown in Table 4, the intercept parameters are significantly different from 
each other so the four categories should not be combined into one. As observed in 
the education gradient between rural and urban areas, there is also an obvious 
education gradient in the distribution of physicians across health institutions. The 
results show that physicians who have education achievements higher than bachelor 
degree are more likely to practice in larger hospitals, after controlling for other 
variables (Table 4). 
 
Discussion 
It will be a little bit ambitious to compare this study with the Flexner Report, an 
epoch-making study of medical education in the United States, written by Abraham 
Flexner and published in 1910 [17]. Our study, however, illustrated a similar story 
that was depicted and criticized by the Flexner Report a century ago. The 
fundamental message between two studies is that too many medical schools 
established and too many “doctors” trained, with significantly different admission 
and graduation standards. Our contribution is that we first pointed out the three-tier 
medical education program in China is a standard policy trade-off between quantity 
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and quality in training health care professionals.  
The advantage of such an education system is to increase the quantity of 
physicians supplied but at the expense of quality in education training. The previous 
researches pay more attention to the benefits of adopting a multi-tiered medical 
education system to the improvement of population health in the pre-reform era, 
such as the public health contribution of barefoot doctors to the decrease of 
mortality rate in China [18]. By contrast, little attention has been rigorously paid to 
the costs that the society pays by adopting a multi-tiered medical education system, 
especial for the post-reform era that China has experienced an epidemiologic 
transition from communicable to non-communicable diseases (NCDs). Our paper fills 
this gap by analyzing the impact of heterogeneity in medical education on both 
efficiency and equity in the delivery of health care system in China. Our analysis 
yields three important findings. 
First, the geographic distribution of physicians in China is not uniform across 
physicians with different education training. We find the evidence that high-educated 
doctors are more likely to practice in urban areas while low-educated doctors are 
more likely to practice in rural areas. A number of evidences in both China and 
international show physicians’ human capital is most strongly associated with bad 
health outcomes through the mechanism of poor diagnosis decision [19-21]. Given 
that high-educated doctors are in a better position to provide high-quality health 
care, the concentration of high-educated physicians in urban areas indicate that 
there is an inequality in the delivery of health care services between rural and urban 
areas in that rural residents are in a disadvantage position to receive the high-quality 
health care services.  
Second, we also find the evidence that high-educated doctors are more likely to 
be hired by larger hospitals, which in turn add the fuel to foster the hospital-center 
health care system in China as patients choose large hospitals to chase good doctors. 
However, chasing good doctors in large hospitals has a price to pay: deteriorating the 
trust relationship between patients and their doctors. This is because the large 
patient volumes put patients in a very difficult position to build the long-term 
15 
 
relationship with their doctors. 
Third, the heterogeneity in medical education also creates both adverse 
selection and moral hazard to the health care market in China. On one hand, the 
heterogeneous education system deter the entry of high-competent doctors into the 
health care market as the regulated market only pay the average salary to all doctors 
and hence good doctors do not receive a good pay. On the other hand, the 
heterogeneity in medical education deter the incentive for continuing education and 
new investment on human capitals among the existing doctors as the rate of return 
of such an investment is low, which in turn removes incentives to develop credentials 
or qualifications.  
Perspectives from economic theories 
In this subsection, we further discuss the impact of heterogeneity in medical 
education on the efficiency of health care sector from three perspectives: (1) 
patients; (2) physicians; and (3) the system.  
From the patients’ perspective, the heterogeneity in medical education imposes 
additional search and informational costs to seek for good doctors. China, like many 
other Asian countries including Japan and South Korea, has a closed-staff hospital 
system whereby physicians practicing in hospitals are employees of hospitals [22]. In 
addition, few physicians in China practice in their own clinics. Given the fact that 
public hospitals and other public health institutions account for about 90% of market 
share in China’s health sector, physicians serving as state employees are just similar 
to civil servants which in turn are subject to several government regulations, such as 
headcount quota and the link of physician licensing with employed institutions. As a 
result, physicians are restricted to have the mobility opportunity across health 
institutions.  
Due to the asymmetric information in health care market, patients often do not 
possess full information to know who good doctors are. Rather, according to our 
results reported at Tables 3 and 4, patients only have limited information to know 
that good doctors (as measured by sufficient education training) are in large hospitals 
and in urban sectors. Thus, patients need to incur two additional costs to find a good 
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doctor: search cost and time cost. Search cost is also called the cost of frictional 
market that has been extensively studied by the search and matching theory [23, 24]. 
In the theory, any patient exercising rational efforts keeps on searching for better 
physicians till the moment that extra cost of searching is less than the marginal 
benefits which the physician provides. Search cost consists of external and internal 
costs [25]. External costs refer to the monetary costs of searching the quality 
information provided by physicians and the opportunity cost of searching time. 
Internal costs refer to mental efforts of quality information searching, sorting and 
integration. Undoubtedly, a market with heterogeneous physicians will significantly 
increase the search cost, as no minimum quality assurance guarantee exists in the 
market.  
Since patients need to spend more time to chasing good doctors, which in turn 
imposes a higher “time costs” to the patients and their family. This incentive in turn 
creates a hospital-centered health system in China as good doctors are locked in 
larger hospitals located in urban areas. As a result, the associated time costs spent on 
searching for and get access to good doctors in larger hospitals, such as additional 
time costs allocated to travel and long waiting time, are efficiency loss in China’s 
health system.  
In addition, the hospital-centered health system put patients in a difficulty 
position to build the trust and long-term relationship with their doctors. This is 
because higher search cost will definitely yield higher transaction costs, in which one 
of the most serious results is patients’ low trust in physicians. Low trust is sometimes 
considered as the biggest threat on physician-patient relationships. As the time cost 
is very high to get access to doctors in larger hospitals, especially for patients come 
from the rural areas, the patient-physician relationship just like “one-time buyers” 
instead of “repeat customers”. Furthermore, given the high patient volumes in larger 
hospitals, physicians only can spend a very short time with each patient. Taken 
together, chasing a good doctor in larger hospitals end up with the attenuation of the 
trust relationship between patients and physicians, as observed by the increasing 
number of medical malpractice litigations in recent years [26]. To mitigate the threat 
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of medical malpractice litigation, physicians in turn adopt the strategy of defensive 
medicines, such as over prescription [27], which also end up with rising health care 
cost and imposing the efficiency loss to the health care system.  
From the perspective of physicians, the heterogeneity of medical education 
imposes two type of efficiency loss to health care market: adverse selection and 
moral hazard. According to the model developed by Akerlof in 1970s, high-quality 
doctors will not enter the market if patients don’t observe physician’s ability that 
only physician knows and physicians’ fees will not depend on the quality of services 
[15]. There is an efficiency loss in terms of the reduction in social welfare when the 
quacks prevail in the market and the average quality of health care decrease. It is 
reasonable that the case is especially serious for a market in full of physicians with 
heterogeneous education training.  
Shapiro assumes service quality derives directly from endogenous human 
capital investment on the one hand, and affects physicians’ reputations on the other 
hand [28]. There is a quality deterioration effect if asymmetric information on the 
investment between physician and patient exists in the market. Specifically, the 
quality services will be primarily undersupplied because of the imperfect reputation 
mechanism or moral hazard problems among heterogeneous physicians.  
In addition, health care market is generally a twofold market with an upstream 
market, the physicians market, and a downstream market, the market for delivering 
health care services. Therefore, the cost of upstream market will be transmitted to 
the downstream market [29]. In this case, if we assume low-quality doctors have a 
smaller market share or allocation size than high-quality doctors, e.g. smaller number 
of inpatients workload among low-quality doctors. Then the group of quack doctors 
due to physicians’ heterogeneity in training, which in turn have strong motivations to 
provide a large amount of unnecessary health care through physician induced 
demand instead of appropriate diagnoses and treatments. Essentially, it is still the 
cost due to asymmetric information as mentioned in the third stream of costs; 
however it is slightly different from the above as this kind of cost mainly focuses on 
the health services provision.  
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From the perspective of health system as a whole, the heterogeneity in medical 
education distorted the specialty mix in health care market, which in turn leads to a 
higher cost of health service delivery. A series studies have shown that competent 
primary care providers can enhance the performance of the health care system as a 
whole [30, 31]. The heterogeneity of physicians substantially worsens the specialty 
mix because physicians with higher education are more likely to be specialists in 
hospitals. As a result, the shrinkage of doctors at the primary care setting combined 
with low human capital deteriorates the human resources for primary health. In 
addition, when the “low-quality” GP cannot be acting their role in division of labor, 
the search costs further increase due to a lack of information on “gate-keeper” of 
health care system.  
The options of mitigation policy  
Taken together, the heterogeneity of medical education in China has a strong 
negative impact on the performance of health sector in terms of reducing equity and 
efficiency. Since it will take long time for China to achieve uniform quality standard in 
medical education, it is important to seek for other policy options to mitigate the 
current negative impacts arising from the heterogeneous education system for 
medical doctors. Based on the above-mentioned theoretical reason and empirical 
evidence, we discuss several policy options as follows. 
It is obvious that the current <The Law for Licensing Medical Practitioner> 
issued in 1999 needs to be modified. The law allows medical graduates with 
non-bachelor degree to become assistant doctors and then they have the chance to 
obtain the full doctor licensure after they accumulate certain years of work 
experience and pass an examination. Our study recommended to policy makers to 
adopt the globally agreed-upon definition of the doctor/physician and to restrict its 
occupational regulation. The latest version of the International Labor Organization’s 
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) is published in 2012 
(ISCO-08). (Please see section #221: Medical doctor in page 125, 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documen
ts/publication/wcms_172572.pdf) 
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As there are significant disparity in doctors’ education training between rural 
and urban areas as well as between large and small hospitals, it is beneficial to 
establish a learning health system that doctors with low education attainment can 
learn from doctors with high education attainment. This is technical feasible by 
adopting the health information and communication technology to integrate doctors 
in different locations and different institutions into a learning network. This learning 
network provides a platform to close the knowledge gap between rural and urban 
areas as well as between large and small hospitals. Specifically, physicians in rural 
and/or small hospitals can learn from physicians in urban and/or large hospitals 
through the development of clinical pathway, evidence-based care, and 
tele-medicine.  
In addition, it has been widely recognized that reforming payment system is the 
key to increase the efficiency of the health care system [32]. Current payment system 
in China is a volume-based, which rewards physicians according to the volume of 
health care services they provided, such as number of outpatient visits, number of 
inpatient admissions, and number of prescription drugs, instead of the outcomes 
they achieved. During the past decades, many countries have adopted a series of 
reform package to transform their payment system from the traditional 
volume-based to value-based [33]. The value-based payment system emphasize the 
value, which is defined as health outcomes for the money spent, and is in a better 
position to reward the good doctors than the traditional volume-based payment 
system as the value-based payment system provides powerful incentive to encourage 
physician to value better outcome instead of valuing quantity of services [34]. Under 
the traditional payment system, many quality-aspects of health care services, such as 
time, diligence, care, attentiveness, are not reimbursed by the payer [32]. By contrast, 
physicians’ additional efforts and time inputs as well as additional education training, 
which are strongly related to outcome, are reimbursed by the payer under the 
value-based payment system. Thus, good doctors who emphasize patient outcomes 
will receive good pays. Given that reforming the medical education system takes a 
longer time (may be a generation) than reforming payment system (e.g., a few years), 
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a viable policy option for China in the short run is to mitigate the efficiency loss in 
health care market through the payment system reform.  
 
Conclusion 
Like the Flexner Report over a century ago, this study pointed out one thing in 
common between two countries across the history of 100 years, which is featured by 
too many medical schools established and too many “doctors” trained, with 
significantly different admission and graduation standards. This paper reviews the 
historical background of multi-tiered medical education in China and investigates its 
impact on the performance of health care market. Although the multi-tiered medical 
education system enjoyed the benefits of training doctors in a quick way, it also pays 
the price to lower the overall quality of physician training and further the quality of 
health care. Previous literature has paid more attention on the contribution of 
low-quality physicians in achieving the remarkable public health gain, such as the 
legend of barefoot doctors in rural China. By contrast, there is virtual no study to pay 
attention on the cost of such multi-tiered education system to the modern society in 
China.  
The contribution of our paper is to fill the literature gap by providing the 
quantitative evidence on the cost side of the multi-tiered medical education system.  
Based on both national aggregate statistics and provincial survey data, we find 
evidence that high-quality physicians (in terms of higher education attainment) are 
more likely to concentrate in urban areas and in larger hospitals, which in turn create 
significant negative impacts on the performance of health care sector in China. On 
one hand, the unequal distribution of high-quality physicians between urban and 
rural areas amplifies the regional inequality in the access to high-quality care in China. 
On the other hand, the unequal distribution of high-quality physicians across health 
institution also contributing to the formation of hospital-centered health care system, 
which in turn imposes various types of efficiency loss to the health care market in 
China, including a higher time costs of accessing health care services and lower trust 
relationship between physicians and their patients.  
21 
 
Our analysis also indicates that the multi-tiered medical education system will 
not phase out in the near future. As a result, it is important to find an effective policy 
options to mitigate the social costs imposed by the multi-tiered medical education 
system. Our paper highlights two important policy tools in addressing the equity and 
efficiency issues arising from multi-tiered medical education. The first option is to 
use information and communication technologies to integrate high- and low-quality 
physicians into a learning network. The second option is the payment system reform 
to shift the mechanism of rewarding physicians from volume-based to value-based. 
Both policy tools have sound theoretical rationales and empirical evidence, but more 
studies are need for the implementation of these two policies. There are also 
recommendations for future studies, it is important to extend our perspectives on 
the impacts off a heterogeneity of medical education on the health care market to 
other countries, especially those developing countries where the governments hope 
to modernize the health care markets.  
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Figure 1. China’s Doctors and Assistant Doctors by Education Level, 2002-2014 
Sources: Health Statistical Yearbook of China (various years). 
Notes:  
1. Data for 2003-2004 and 2006-2008 are not available.  
2. Bachelor or above refers to the category that doctors have educational achievement high 
than a bachelor degree, including bachelor, master and doctorate degrees; Vocational 
diploma refers to a junior college degree (Zhuan Ke) or a junior tertiary education, generally 
including 3-years post-high-school education; Secondary vocational diploma or below refers 
to both secondary vocational diploma (Zhong Zhuan) and high school education.  
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Figure 2. Time Trend of Medical Graduates by Education Level, 1950-1980, and 
Enrolled Medical Students by Education Level, 1985-2014 
Sources: Health Statistical Yearbook of China (various years). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Educational distribution of new licensed physicians, 2005-2015 
Sources: National Center for Medical Examination in China (various years). 
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Figure 4. Predicted stock change of physicians by education level, 2010-2035 
Notes:  
1. The change of education structure is predicted based on the scenario 2.  
 
 
Figure 5. Time trend of physicians’ density between urban and rural area, 2005-2015 
Sources: Health Statistical Yearbook of China (various years). 
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Table 1. The Evolution of Medical Education in China 
Time 
Period 
Events  (Major Contents of Education Reform ) 
1949 Adopted the Soviet model of autonomous medical universities. 
1966-76 Culture revolution: medical education was disrupted. 
1998 
Introducing education reform that stand-alone medical institutions and schools 
were merged into comprehensive universities. 
2009 
The government adopted a reform plan that aim to phasing-out 3-year medical 
program at secondary level. 
2013 
The government initiated a plan to “standardize” the quality of medical education 
by launching a new system called 5+3: 5 year undergraduate study plus 3 year 
residency.  
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Table 2. Distribution of Doctors (including assistant doctors) by Education Level in 
2005 and 2014 
Educational level 
Urban hospitals (%) Rural township hospitals (%) 
2005 2014 2005 2014 
Bachelor or above 47.2 65.7 3.9 11.9 
Vocational diploma 32.2 24.1 28.8 42.5 
Secondary vocational diploma or below 20.6 10.2 67.3 45.6 
Sources: Health Statistical Yearbook of China 2006 and 2015 
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Table 3. Regression Analysis of the Physician’s Choice on the Practice Location 
between Urban and Rural Areas 
Dependent variable: 
Logit model: Urban (=1) vs. Rural (=0) 
(1) Odds ratio (2) Odds ratio 
Higher Education   
College diploma (Dummy) 2.748*** 2.699*** 
 [2.581, 2.926] [2.516, 2.895] 
Bachelor degree or above (Dummy) 34.480*** 19.591*** 
 [31.665, 37.546] [17.809, 21.552] 
Age 1.043*** 1.040*** 
 [1.040, 1.047] [1.037, 1.043] 
Male 0.435*** 0.474*** 
 [0.408, 0.464] [0.441, 0.509] 
Fixed effects  COUNTY 
Number of Observations 36674 36674 
Log-likelihood function -1.59e+04 -1.34e+04 
Chi squared 10950.468*** 3824.568*** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.257 0.356 
BIC 31759.125 26834.060 
Source: 2009 Fujian province database is a cross-sectional database that collected basic 
characteristics of human resources for health in all of the health institutes. 
Notes:  
1. Exponentiated coefficients are presented in the table; respectively, confidence intervals in 
parentheses. 
2. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
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Table 4. Regression Analysis of the Physician’s Choice on the Practice Location 
between Large and Small Hospitals 
Dependent variable: 
Ordered probit model: Hospital Size 
(1) (2) 
Higher education   
College diploma (Dummy) 0.513*** 0.559*** 
 (0.017) (0.022) 
Bachelor degree or above (Dummy) 1.759*** 1.717*** 
 (0.016) (0.027) 
Age 0.018*** 0.019*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Male -0.381*** -0.406*** 
 (0.013) (0.022) 
   
Cut1        Constant 0.590*** -24.252 
 (0.029) (596.049) 
Cut2        Constant 1.860*** -19.456 
 (0.030) (596.048) 
Cut3        Constant 3.012*** -5.556 
 (0.032) (576.072) 
Fixed effects  COUNTY 
Number of Observations 36674 36674 
Log-likelihood function -4.03e+04 -1.25e+04 
Chi squared 14936.433*** 70457.985*** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.156 0.738 
BIC 80659.477 26115.339 
Source: 2009 Fujian province database is a cross-sectional database that collected basic 
characteristics of human resources for health in all of the health institutes. 
Notes:  
1. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively; 
Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
2. cut1: This is the estimated cutpoint on the latent variable used to differentiate 
Township-level hospital from County level, City level and Provincial level hospitals when 
values of the predictor variables are evaluated at zero. 
cut2: This is the estimated cutpoint on the latent variable used to differentiate 
Township-level and County level hospital from City level and Provincial level hospitals when 
values of the predictor variables are evaluated at zero. 
cut3: This is the estimated cutpoint on the latent variable used to differentiate 
Township-level, County level and City level hospital from Provincial level hospitals when 
values of the predictor variables are evaluated at zero. 
 
